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Human behavior depends on the ability to effectively introspect about our performance.
For simple perceptual decisions, this introspective or metacognitive ability varies substan-
tially across individuals and is correlated with the structure of focal areas in prefrontal cor-
tex. This raises the possibility that the ability to introspect about different perceptual
decisions might be mediated by a common cognitive process. To test this hypothesis, we
examined whether inter-individual differences in metacognitive ability were correlated
across two different perceptual tasks where individuals made judgments about different
and unrelated visual stimulus properties. We found that inter-individual differences were
strongly correlated between the two tasks for metacognitive ability but not objective per-
formance. Such stability of an individual’s metacognitive ability across different perceptual
tasks indicates a general mechanism supporting metacognition independent of the speciﬁc
task.
 2010 Elsevier Inc. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
Virtually everyone, in their everyday lives, regularly makes decisions upon their knowledge of the outside world and the
conﬁdence they have in their knowledge. For example, deciding whether or not to operate on a brain tumor depends on the
conﬁdence a neurosurgeon has in their surgical competency. Similarly, a student facing the choice of university major will
base their decision upon a self-evaluation of their strengths and weakness. This knowledge about one’s own cognition is
known as metacognitive knowledge (Flavell, 1979; Metcalfe & Shimamura, 1994). Metacognitive ability is considered as
an important index of intelligence (Borkowski, Carr, & Pressely, 1987) and consciousness (Persaud, McLeod, & Cowey,
2007), and a capacity more advanced in humans than animals (Smith, 2009; Terrace & Son, 2009).
Metacognitive ability can be expressed as the mapping between objective performance, such as a perceptual judgment on
the duration of a ﬂash, and subjective conﬁdence in the accuracy of such an objective judgment (Kunimoto, Miller, & Pashler,
2001; Galvin, Podd, Drga, & Whitmore, 2003; Lau & Passingham, 2006). Just as the ability of making correct objective judg-
ments varies substantially among individuals (Halpern, Andrews, & Purves, 1999; Kirchhoff & Buckner, 2006), the metacogni-
tive ability of determiningwhether these judgments are correct also shows individual differences.While some people can give
an accurate evaluation on their ownperformance or knowledge, others consistently fail to do so. A recent study showed a strik-
ing link between suchmetacognitive differences and the anatomical structure of rostral prefrontal cortex (Fleming,Weil, Nagy,
Dolan, & Rees, 2010). This study suggests a focal neuroanatomical basis formetacognitive ability (at least in the perceptual taskive Neuroscience, University College London, 17 Queen Square, London WC1N 3AR, UK. Fax: +44 (0)20
).
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speciﬁcally to the perceptual task on which the participants evaluated their performance, or might generalize to other tasks.
In general, an individual’s performance depends on the perceptual task involved, even for apparently related perceptual
tasks. For example, individuals who perform well at orientation discrimination do not necessarily perform well on motion
discrimination (Halpern et al., 1999). Whether similar differences exist for metacognitive knowledge about these tasks is not
clear. Here, we therefore compared the metacognitive ability of a group of individuals independently evaluating their per-
formance on two different perceptual tasks. To anticipate our ﬁndings, we found that while individuals’ visual performance
differed substantially across the two perceptual tasks (i.e., individuals doing well in one task may not do well in the other
task), metacognitive ability was instead consistent across the different tasks (i.e., individuals with high metacognitive ability
in one task had similarly high metacognitive ability in the other task). In contrast to the traditional framework suggesting the
involvement of task-speciﬁc brain mechanisms (Nelson & Narens, 1990), our study indicates that metacognitive ability may
be mediated, at least for visual perceptual tasks, by a single brain mechanism.
2. Material and methods
We studied themetacognitive abilities of individuals performing two different visual tasks – a contrast discrimination task
and an orientation discrimination task (Fig. 1a). On a trial-by-trial basis, participants made objective perceptual judgments on
the contrast or the orientation of the visual stimuli, and assessed their conﬁdence in the accuracy of perceptual judgments.
The interrelationship between the perceptual judgment and the conﬁdence rating reﬂects their metacognitive ability.
2.1. Participants
Eighteen healthy volunteers (10 females, 8 males, aged 19–33) with normal or corrected-to-normal vision participated in
this study. All gave written informed consent, and the study was approved by the local ethics committee.
2.2. Stimuli
In both tasks, visual stimuli comprised six vertical gratings (2.8 visual degrees in diameter, spatial frequency of 2.2 cycles
per visual degree, contrast of 20%) arranged in a circular fashion (eccentricity of 6.9 visual degrees) around a central ﬁxation
cross. The stimuli were presented on a calibrated CRT monitor (size 2200, spatial resolution of 1024  768 pixels, refresh rate
of 100 Hz, viewing distance of 67 cm), and the experiment was conducted in a darkened room with the monitor providing
the only signiﬁcant source of light. The stimuli and the experiment were programmed in MATLAB (Mathworks Inc., Natick,
MA, USA) using Psychtoolbox (Brainard, 1997).
2.3. Procedure
On each trial, the visual stimuli were presented twice with each presentation lasting 200 ms and the inter-stimulus inter-
val lasting 500 ms. In one of the two presentation intervals, the six gratings were exactly the same, but in the other interval,
one of the six gratings differed from the rest by a higher contrast (task one) or slightly different orientation (task two). The
temporal interval and spatial position of the pop-out grating varied randomly between trials.
Participants made an unspeeded two-interval forced choice judgment as to which interval contained the pop-out grating.
In addition to making the objective visual judgments, participants provided ratings of conﬁdence in their perceptual deci-
sions on a scale of 1 (low conﬁdence) to 6 (high conﬁdence) (Fleming et al., 2010). The difﬁculty of the visual judgments,
i.e., the parameter (contrast in task one, orientation in task two) of the pop-out grating, was varied in a 2-up-1-down stair-
case fashion (Levitt, 1971) to keep each participant in the near threshold region (such that performance converged on 70.7%
correct) (Fig. 1b). Two consecutive correct visual judgments led to the parameter of the pop-out grating in the next trial
being one step lower than in the previous trials, whereas one incorrect visual judgment led to an increase in the parameter
of the pop-out grating. The step size was 2% (contrast, task one) or 0.5 degree (orientation, task two). Participants were in-
structed to use the whole conﬁdence scale and to bear in mind that the scale represented relative conﬁdence, since given the
difﬁcult nature of the visual tasks, they would rarely be completely certain that they made a correct visual judgment.
For each task, participants completed 540 trials (split into 6 blocks of 90 trials). The starting parameter of the pop-out
grating in the ﬁrst block was the discrimination threshold measured through a preliminary experiment that involved visual
judgments without conﬁdence rating. In the following blocks, the starting parameter was the discrimination threshold in the
last block. In order to control practice effects that may unevenly inﬂuence individual performance in the ﬁrst versus second
task, the experiment sequence was the same for all participants.
2.4. Data analysis
Visual performance was evaluated by calculating the contrast (task one) and orientation (task two) discrimination thresh-
olds, at which the accuracy of visual judgements converged to 70.7% as a result of the 2-up-1-down staircase procedure (Le-
vitt, 1971). The discrimination threshold was calculated as the average contrast or orientation of the pop-out grating.
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Fig. 1. Schematic depiction of experiment paradigm. (a) Participants made a two-interval forced choice judgment on which temporal interval contained the
grating that popped out in contrast (task one) or orientation (task two). Following their objective perceptual judgment, participants also provided a rating of
conﬁdence in their visual performance. (b) To induce uncertainty about the visual judgments, the parameter (contrast in task one, orientation in task two) of
the pop-out grating was varied in the 2-up-1-down staircase fashion to keep each participant’s performance near threshold. The participants’ visual
performance was evaluated by the average parameter of the pop-out grating, i.e., the discrimination threshold. (c) Metacognitive ability was quantiﬁed by
the interrelationship between conﬁdence ratings and the accuracy of visual judgments using the type II receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve, which
characterized the probability of being correct for a given level of conﬁdence.
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ments using the type II receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curve (Fig. 1c) (Galvin et al., 2003; Kornbrot, 2006; Fleming
et al., 2010). The type II ROC curve characterized the probability of being correct for a given level of conﬁdence. To construct
the ROC curve, p (conﬁdence = i | correct) and p (conﬁdence = i | incorrect) were calculated for all i, and were then trans-
formed into cumulative probabilities and plotted against each other. The area underlying the ROC curve quantiﬁed the meta-
cognitive ability. This area was calculated by the sum of the area between the ROC curve and the diagonal (dark green1 area
in Fig. 1c) and the area of the half-square triangle (light green area in Fig. 1c): AROC ¼ 0:25
P6
i¼1 Yiþ1  Xið Þ2  Yi  Xiþ1ð Þ2
h i
þ 0:5
(Kornbrot, 2006). The mean conﬁdence rating was also calculated for each participant in each task. It reﬂects the bias an indi-
vidual has towards using higher or lower conﬁdence ratings. The mean conﬁdence rating correlates very well with the conﬁ-
dence bias reﬂected by the ROC curve: BROC ¼ ln
P3
i¼1 Yiþ1  Xið Þ2  Yi  Xiþ1ð Þ2
h i .P6
i¼4 Yiþ1  Xið Þ2  Yi  Xiþ1ð Þ2
h i1 For interpretation of color in Figs. 1 and 2, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.
1790 C. Song et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 20 (2011) 1787–1792(r = 0.94, p < 1018). The ROC model provided a good ﬁt to our data (for the linear regression between z(Y) and z(X), mean
R2 = 0.985 ± 0.003, mean slope = 0.809 ± 0.024).
3. Results
For both tasks (contrast discrimination and orientation discrimination), we found considerable inter-individual variability
in visual performance (contrast discrimination threshold from 7% to 15%, orientation discrimination threshold from 1.7 de-
grees to 3.4 degrees). We also found similarly large variability across participants in their metacognitive ability (AROC = 0.62–
0.80), conﬁdence level (average conﬁdence rating = 1.6–4.5). Thus, our tasks produced a variable range of objective perfor-
mance and metacognitive ability that were neither at ceiling nor ﬂoor.
Across participants, neither metacognitive ability nor conﬁdence level correlated with objective performance (correlation
between metacognitive ability and visual performance, task one: r = 0.15, p = 0.55, task two: r = 0.09, p = 0.72; correlation be-
tween conﬁdence level and visual performance, task one: r = 0.26,p = 0.30, task two: r = 0.01,p = 0.95; Fig. 2a), establishing that
the measurement of an individual’s metacognitive ability was not confounded by the stimulus parameters in the visual tasks.
When we compared individuals’ performance across the two tasks, we found no correlation in their objective visual per-
formance (r = 0.05, p = 0.83, Fig. 2c). However, metacognitive ability showed a highly signiﬁcant correlation between the two
different tasks (r = 0.71, p < 0.001, Fig. 2c), as did conﬁdence level (r = 0.70, p < 0.002, Fig. 2c). Interestingly, the mean meta-
cognitive ability across participants did not show any signiﬁcant difference between the two tasks (t(17) = 1.8, p = 0.094,
Fig. 2c), whereas the average conﬁdence level was much lower in the orientation discrimination task compared with the con-
trast discrimination task (t(17) = 4.7, p < 0.001, Fig. 2c). This indicates that the conﬁdence level consists of a task-indepen-
dent component which reﬂects the general conﬁdence one has (i.e., individuals gave high/low conﬁdence ratings in one
task tended to gave high/low ratings in the other task), as well as a task-dependent component which reﬂects the conﬁdence0.65
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Fig. 2. Experiment results. (a) For both tasks, there existed no correlation between visual performance and metacognitive ability or mean conﬁdence level.
(b) Metacognitive ability and conﬁdence level were not correlated. (c) Though participants’ visual performance was not correlated across two tasks,
correlations were observed between task-speciﬁc metacognitive abilities, and between task-speciﬁc mean conﬁdence levels. Moreover, while
metacognitive ability did not show signiﬁcant difference between two tasks, mean conﬁdence level was much lower in task two (orientation
discrimination task) than task one (contrast discrimination task).
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objective performance was dependent on the speciﬁc task (contrast or orientation discrimination), the metacognitive ability
exhibited by our participants was task-independent; and their conﬁdence levels reﬂected both task-independent self-con-
ﬁdence as well as the evaluation of task difﬁculty.
We also found that metacognitive ability and conﬁdence level were not correlated (task one: r = 0.08, p = 0.74; task two:
r = 0.08, p = 0.76; Fig. 2b). Speciﬁcally, individuals with higher conﬁdence were not better at evaluating their performance
and vice versa. This further supports a signal detection theoretic approach where metacognitive ability (sensitivity) and
the conﬁdence level (bias) are considered as two independent properties (Galvin et al., 2003).
4. Discussion
An interesting question in metacognition is its relationship with more fundamental aspects of cognition such as visual
perception. By deﬁnition, metacognition is cognition about cognition (Metcalfe & Shimamura, 1994), implying a mutual rela-
tionship between metacognition and cognition. Indeed, a traditional view holds that metacognition represents the dynam-
ical interplay between a cognition-level and a meta-level (Nelson & Narens, 1990). The cognition-level provides the meta-
level with accessible information for introspection and updates the meta-level’s model of the cognition-level, whereas infor-
mation ﬂowing back from the meta-level implements control over the cognition-level such as terminating a cognition-level
behavior. This framework thus predicts that introspective or metacognitive ability is mediated by several brain processes,
including those responsible for different perceptual decisions, and that metacognitive performance might differ when com-
paring different perceptual or cognitive tasks.
However, we found that an individual’s metacognitive ability measured in one visual task could predict their metacog-
nitive ability in a second visual task, independent of the variability in their objective performance on perceptual decisions.
This result suggests that metacognitive ability, at least for the tasks studied, shares a common cognitive process independent
of the perceptual task. It is also consistent with observations that the ability to introspect about perceptual decisions is cor-
related with the anatomical microstructure of a single cortical location dissociated from those concerned with visual percep-
tion such as the sensory cortices (Fleming et al., 2010). One limitation of our study is the relative similarity between two
perceptual tasks. Participants’ objective performances were not correlated across two tasks, indicating that the correlation
we observed in metacognitive ability is unlikely to result from common mechanisms for perceptual decision making. Nev-
ertheless, the two perceptual tasks both involve visual processing and share similar paradigms. It would be of interest for
future studies to now address whether metacognitive ability shows a similar correlation between tasks involving different
perceptual modalities, such as vision and audition.
Parallel to our work, a recent experiment reported a dissociation between metacognitive and cognitive performance
(Rounis, Maniscalco, Rothwell, Passingham, & Lau, 2010). Speciﬁcally, altering metacognition either through visual masking
or transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) of dorsal-lateral prefrontal cortex does not seem to affect visual performance per
se (Lau & Passingham, 2006; Rounis et al., 2010). These studies showed the constancy in perceptual performance under shifts
in metacognitive performance. However, empirical support for the constancy of metacognition under changes in cognitive
task has been lacking, and our study provides the ﬁrst evidence for this. Together these lines of new evidence suggest the
independence of metacognitive awareness from primary cognition (Lau, 2008).
The dissociation of metacognition from task-speciﬁc systems has direct implications for the conceptual framework of
consciousness (Crick & Koch, 2003; Ramsoy & Overgaard, 2004; Tononi, 2008; Lau, 2008). Metacognitive ability has been
widely used as an assessment of perceptual awareness (Poppel, Held, & Frost, 1973; Trevethan, Sahraie, & Weiskrantz,
2007; Persaud et al., 2007; Koch & Preuschoff, 2007; Kanai, Walsh, & Tseng, 2010). In the absence of awareness, such as
in the case of blindsight, patients often claim no subjective experience of seeing despite their above-chance accuracy in vi-
sual discrimination (Poppel et al., 1973; Trevethan et al., 2007; Persaud et al., 2007). These observations have led to propos-
als that consciousness is not reﬂected in the perceptual processing per se (e.g., high accuracy in visual discrimination) but
rather in the introspective awareness of perceptual processing (i.e. metacognitive ability) (Ramsoy & Overgaard, 2004;
Lau, 2008). Thus, a key neural component for introspective awareness may be the prefrontal cortical regions associated with
metacognitive ability (Del Cul, Dehaene, Reyes, Bravo, & Slachevsky, 2009; Fleming et al., 2010; Rounis et al., 2010).
Since metacognitive ability is an individual attribute dissociable from performance on perceptual tasks, our study further
suggests the use of metacognitive ability as a method of quantifying higher-order aspects of consciousness (Ramsoy & Overg-
aard, 2004; Lau, 2008). Intuitively, conﬁdence in perceptual performance requires monitoring not only the perceptual stim-
ulation, but also one’s response to the stimulation. Thus, an individual’s metacognitive ability may be partially separable
from perceptual processing (Sandberg, Timmermans, Overggard, & Cleeremans, 2010), and may additionally rely on the efﬁ-
cacy of response monitoring mechanisms (Yeung, Botvinick, & Cohen, 2004). The relationship between these constructs re-
mains to be determined by future studies.
5. Conclusions
In conclusion, we found that individuals’ metacognitive knowledge of perceptual performance remained stable across
two different visual tasks, even though the individual objective performance changed substantially between different tasks.
1792 C. Song et al. / Consciousness and Cognition 20 (2011) 1787–1792This indicates that the higher-order metacognitive ability is likely to be mediated by a general mechanism independent of
the ﬁrst-order cognitive task.
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